
















































































































They	 are	 not	 intended	 as	 empirical	 generalizations	 about	 how	 particular	
languages	or	idiosyncratic	social	practices	work.		Rather,	they	are	proposed	as	















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































they	 do	 in	 traditional	 philosophy.…	 	 What	 defeats	 a	 model	 is	 not	 a	
counterexample	 but	 a	 better	 model,	 one	 that	 retains	 its	 predecessor's	
successes	while	adding	some	more	of	its	own.…	If	epistemologists	and	other	
philosophers	 start	 aiming	 to	 build	 good	 models	 rather	 than	 provide	




































































































theory	 had	 the	 strongest	 immediate	 impact	 was	 in	 computer	 science	 as	 a	
theoretical	foundation	for	database	updates.		(Gärdenfors	2011,	p.	118)34	
Later	in	the	same	piece,	Gärdenfors	discusses	adopting	principles	of	belief	revision	
into	principles	for	non-monotonic	reasoning.		There’s	no	reason	why	the	“theories”	
that	appear	in	AGM	models	must	be	interpreted	as	sets	of	beliefs,	rather	than	sets	of	
norms	in	a	legal	code	or	items	in	a	database.		Separating	abstract	structures	from	
	
33	Cf.	Colyvan:	"As	with	empirical	models	we	are	interested	in	whether	a	given	model—as	a	whole—
is	adequate	for	the	purpose	for	which	it	was	designed."		(2013,	p.	1348)	
34	Notice	also	that	the	very	first	paragraph	of	the	famous	(1985)	AGM	paper	contains	a	reference	to	
the	process	“known	among	legal	theorists	as	the	derogation	of	x	from	A.”		
their	interpretations	allows	the	same	structures	to	be	used	in	multiple	
applications.35		And	there's	no	reason	a	particular	abstract	structure	must	be	used	
either	normatively	or	descriptively	but	not	both;	Bayesian	and	decision-theoretic	
formalisms	have	been	applied	in	psychology,	cognitive	science,	economics,	etc.	
	
5.	Concerns	about	normative	modeling	
	
I	will	now	examine	some	concerns	that	might	arise	about	applying	a	modeling	
methodology	to	normative	inquiries.	
	
•	Systematizability	of	the	domain.		The	idea	that	we	can	identify	a	domain	of	
applicability,	fit	a	formal	modeling	framework	to	truths	in	that	domain,	then	rely	on	
that	framework	to	predict	further	normative	truths	within	the	domain,	seems	to	
make	assumptions	about	the	nature	of	the	normative.		Those	assumptions	are	tricky	
to	state	precisely	without	prejudging	the	issue,	so	let	me	instead	identify	them	by	
describing	some	types	of	theorists	who	would	resist	them.	
	 First,	I	imagine	that	normative	particularists	(e.g.,	Dancy	2013)	will	object	to	
a	modeling	methodology.		They	will	wonder	why	we	assume	that	the	normative	
truths	in	distinct	situations	fit	into	any	sort	of	pattern,	such	that	a	framework	
designed	to	fit	some	cases	will	be	able	to	predict	truths	in	others.		Of	course,	the	
modeling	methodology	I	propose	is	not	the	only	normative	approach	subject	to	
particularist	complaint.		In	fact,	normative	modeling	may	not	be	as	objectionable	to	
the	particularist	as	the	typical	method	of	normative	theorizing	by	laying	out	
principles.		That	method	usually	aims	for	principles	that	are	fully	general;	hence	its	
aggressive	reaction	to	proposed	counterexamples.		That	such	principles	are	
available	assumes	the	denial	of	particularism.		Normative	modeling,	on	the	other	
hand,	attempts	to	systematize	limited	swaths	of	the	normative	domain,	identified	as	
the	domains	of	applicability	of	particular	modeling	frameworks.		There	need	be	no	
assumption	that	fully	general	principles	are	available.		The	normative	modeler	
proceeds	piecemeal,	trying	to	solve	local	problems	and	gradually	extend	the	
boundaries	of	normative	knowledge.		(In	this	she	is	much	like	the	working	scientist.)		
The	modeler	does	not	fully	yield	to	the	particularist’s	insistence	on	treating	each	
case	on	its	own	terms,	but	neither	does	she	assume	that	the	normative	is	a	single,	
systematizable	domain.	
	 Second,	some	non-particularists	may	acknowledge	patterns	among	the	
normative	truths,	but	deny	that	these	patterns	can	be	represented	in	formal	
structures.		For	instance,	Goodman	famously	concluded	from	his	discussion	of	the	
grue	paradox	that,	“Lawlike	or	projectible	hypotheses	cannot	be	distinguished	on	
any	merely	syntactical	grounds	or	even	on	the	ground	that	these	hypotheses	are	
somehow	purely	general	in	meaning.”	(1955,	p.	83)		Goodman	meant	to	bury	
Carnap's	and	Hempel’s	project	of	capturing	confirmation	(a	normative	notion)	in	a	
	
35	Compare	the	notion	of	“re-semantification”	in	Dutilh	Novaes	(2012,	Section	6.1.2),	and	also	
Weisberg	(2013,	p.	77):	“The	same	structure	can	be	given	an	entirely	new	construal	when	a	model	is	
borrowed	from	another	area	or	problem.”	
formal	construct.		Perhaps	some	normative	domains	are	systematizable,	but	not	by	
formal	means.	
	 I	tend	to	disagree	with	Goodman	about	the	particulars—problems	like	grue	
that	look	like	formal	headaches	usually	turn	on	a	deep	issue	having	nothing	to	do	
with	formalization	(Titelbaum	2010).		But	I	certainly	can’t	argue	against	his	
conclusion	here,	or	support	any	claim	to	the	effect	that	all	generality	supports	
formal	representation.		I	will	simply	say	that	in	this	piece	I	am	trying	to	describe	
formal	normative	modeling	and	contrast	it	with	other	methodologies	formal	
normative	theorists	might	apply.		If	the	underlying	normative	domains	are	not	
systematizable	by	any	formal	means,	all	of	these	methodologies	are	in	equal	trouble.	
		
•	Whence	the	“data”?		Earlier	I	distinguished	normative	from	descriptive	models	in	
terms	of	the	data	they	attempt	to	fit.		Normative	models	attempt	to	fit	normative	
data,	such	as	prescriptive	or	evaluative	facts.		One	might	wonder	where	a	modeler	is	
to	acquire	such	“data”.36		Is	normative	modeling	just	a	cover	for	the	modeler’s	
codifying	her	own	intuitions?	
	 The	origin	of	the	data	is	an	important	concern	for	the	modeler,	but	is	not	a	
concern	for	the	modeling	process	itself.		In	the	sciences,	gathering	reliable	data	is	a	
crucial	project,	but	the	process	of	building	a	model	from	the	data	is	usually	separate	
from	that	project.37		The	modeling	process	asks	what	predictions	fit	best	with	a	
given	set	of	data;	even	if	the	factivity	of	the	data	is	later	challenged,	the	model's	
results	about	what	predictions	best	fit	the	data	still	stand.		Of	course,	fitting	certain	
batches	of	data	with	a	model	sometimes	proves	so	difficult	that	it	motivates	the	
modeler	to	reexamine	the	data.		(Perhaps	the	modeling	effort	has	made	specific	
subsets	of	the	data	particularly	suspect.)		But	usually	a	modeling	enterprise	
ventures	forward	from	the	data	as	a	given.	
	 Normative	modeling	requires	a	set	of	normative	facts	taken	as	given.		Those	
facts	may	have	been	provided	by	intuition,	but	they	may	also	have	been	provided	by	
rigorous	argumentation.		They	may	even	have	resulted	from	a	previous	modeling	
exercise!38		Certainly	the	trustworthiness	of	any	predictions	produced	by	the	
modeling	depends	on	the	trustworthiness	of	this	data.		(Again,	we	can	roughly	think	
of	the	modeling	framework	as	yielding	conditional	predictions:	“If	such-and-such	
are	normative	truths,	then	so-and-so	are	as	well.”)		But	as	long	as	one	grants	that	
there	are	normative	facts	at	all,	and	that	some	of	them	can	(somehow)	be	known,	
	
36	Compare's	Colyvan's	concerns	about	"empirically	testing"	normative	models	at	his	(2013,	pp.	
1347ff).		With	respect	to	normative	models	one	might	also	worry	whether	there	are	any	normative	
truths	to	serve	as	data	at	all.		But	such	metanormative	skepticism	(perhaps	in	the	mode	of	Mackie	
(1977))	will	be	a	challenge	to	any	of	the	methodologies	of	normative	theorizing	with	which	a	
modeling	approach	might	be	compared,	so	it	is	not	a	particular	challenge	to	our	approach.			
37	Which	is	not	to	say	that	modeling	is	always	posterior	to	data	collection.		Good	modeling	may	send	
us	back	to	our	data-gathering	mechanisms	to	ask	further	questions.		My	point	here	is	that	the	process	
of	modeling	itself	is	usually	distinct	from	whatever	tools	we	are	using	for	data	collection.	
38	This	phenomenon	is	hardly	unique	to	normative	modeling.		For	example,	Edwards	(2010)	details	
how	the	data	fed	into	global	climate	prediction	models	are	often	the	output	of	more	local	models	
applied	to	unreliable	instrumentation	or	incomplete	records	from	the	past.	
normative	modeling	is	an	appealing	candidate	methodology	for	extending	that	
normative	knowledge	base.	
	
•	What	modeling	achieves.		Beneath	the	two	previous	concerns	I	sometimes	detect	a	
broader	suspicion:	Even	if	a	modeling	exercise	is	successful,	what	will	it	have	
achieved?		Models	may	track	local	generalities	over	limited	domains	of	applicability,	
but	we	wanted	the	true,	fully	general	normative	principles.		Modeling	may	take	us	
from	normative	givens	to	further	conclusions,	but	we	wanted	absolute	normative	
truth	derived	from	no	assumptions—to	trace	the	normative	back	to	its	foundations.		
Modeling	may	produce	formal	structures	fitting	a	set	of	data,	but	we	wanted	
understanding.			
My	first	response	to	these	challenges	is	that	I	don’t	picture	formal	normative	
modeling	as	the	only	methodology	we	should	use	to	investigate	the	normative,	or	
even	the	only	formal	methodology	we	should	use.		Formal	normative	modeling	is	a	
tool—one	of	many	tools	in	our	philosophical	toolbox—and	like	any	tool	it	is	
appropriate	for	only	certain	purposes.	
So	what	can	formal	normative	modeling	achieve	for	us?		First,	it	can	give	us	
answers	to	specific	normative	questions.		If	we	don’t	know	what	would	be	required,	
or	what	would	be	rational,	in	a	particular	situation,	a	normative	model	fit	to	other	
known	normative	facts	can	give	us	an	answer.		Second,	simply	providing	a	formal	
framework	that	fits	normative	facts	over	a	limited	domain	can	reveal	patterns	that	
aid	our	understanding.		And	third,	formal	normative	modeling	can	be	used	in	
tandem	with	other	methodologies	to	pursue	the	broader	goals	just	described.		By	
moving	from	narrow	models	to	models	with	broader	and	broader	domains	of	
applicability,	perhaps	we	can	approach	the	fully	general	principles	in	some	
normative	area	(if	there	are	any).		Nowadays	we	view	Newtonian	mechanics	as	a	
formalism	useful	only	over	a	limited	domain,	but	no	one	would	deny	that	it	has	
aided	our	understanding	of	the	natural	world	and	was	a	crucial	building	block	
towards	the	theories	that	supplanted	it.	
Let	me	give	one	example	of	a	positive	product	from	a	formal	exercise	in	a	
normative	domain:	Bayesian	epistemology	can	be	used	not	only	to	generate	new	
credence	functions	from	old,	but	also	to	assess	how	strongly	a	piece	of	evidence	
confirms	a	hypothesis	relative	to	a	particular	credence	distribution.		Hempel's	
famous	Paradox	of	the	Ravens	(Hempel	1945)	asks	why	observing	a	black	raven	
confirms	the	hypothesis	that	all	ravens	are	black	more	than	observing	a	non-black	
non-raven	does.39		Fitelson	and	Hawthorne	(2010)	used	Bayesian	mathematics	to	
show	that	a	rational	agent	will	take	a	black	raven	to	confirm	the	ravens	hypothesis	
more	strongly	than	a	non-black	non-raven	does	when	the	following	two	conditions	
are	met:	(1)	the	agent	takes	her	sampling	process	to	be	such	that	the	ratio	of	non-
black	objects	to	ravens	it	produces	will	tend	to	be	greater	than	1;	and	(2)	learning	
	
39	The	crux	of	the	problem	being	that	the	ravens	hypothesis	that	all	ravens	are	black	is	logically	
equivalent	to	the	hypothesis	that	all	non-black	things	are	non-ravens;	the	latter	seems	to	be	
confirmed	by	any	non-black	non-raven;	and	by	some	sort	of	transitivity	of	confirmation	it	therefore	
seems	that	a	non-black	non-raven	should	confirm	that	all	ravens	are	black.	
that	the	ravens	hypothesis	was	true	would	not	dramatically	increase	this	ratio	for	
the	agent.	
This	is	a	novel	prediction.		I	take	it	that	these	sufficient	conditions	do	not	just	
spring	into	your	mind	upon	contemplation	of	the	problem;	historically,	no	one	had	
suggested	these	two	particular	conditions	as	sufficient	until	Fitelson	and	Hawthorne	
performed	their	formal	analysis.		Once	uncovered,	the	conditions	are	borne	out	by	
various	considerations.		For	instance,	it's	plausible	that	as	we	wander	around	the	
world	and	encounter	objects	at	random,	we	take	ourselves	to	be	implementing	a	
sampling	process	that	satisfies	the	two	conditions.		And	in	these	circumstances,	to	
the	extent	we're	rational	we	take	our	encounters	with	black	ravens	to	be	better	
news	for	the	ravens	hypothesis	than,	say,	our	run-ins	with	red	robins.		On	the	other	
hand,	if	I	were	wandering	through	the	Hall	of	Atypically-Colored	Birds	(featuring	
birds	of	a	different	color	than	the	majority	of	their	species	brethren),	encountering	a	
black	raven	would	be	much	worse	news	for	the	ravens	hypothesis	than	encountering	
a	red	robin.		Yet	sampling	from	the	Hall	of	Atypically-Colored	Birds	does	not	meet	
the	two	conditions	above.40	
These	considerations	support	the	sufficiency	of	Fitelson	and	Hawthorne's	
conditions.		But	by	far	the	best	argument	for	that	sufficiency	comes	from	the	
Bayesian	analysis	itself.		The	Bayesian	formalism	has	provided	independently	
plausible	results	in	other	contexts,	so	we	believe	the	normative	prediction	it	makes	
about	how	a	rational	agent	should	see	the	confirmational	landscape	in	the	ravens	
case.41	
	
6.	Conclusion	
	
As	I	indicated	at	the	outset,	this	essay	has	been	generally	exploratory.		I	have	tried	to	
sketch	a	formal	modeling	methodology	for	normative	inquiries,	indicate	its	
advantages,	and	assess	its	potential	drawbacks.		A	clear	area	for	further	research	
would	be	to	compare	this	methodology	to	other	methodologies	that	might	be	
applied	to	normative	formal	work,	such	as	reflective	equilibrium	(Rawls	1971)	and	
Carnapian	explication	(Carnap	1950).	
Yet	to	make	a	fair	comparison,	each	of	those	methodologies	would	need	to	be	
developed	in	slightly	new	directions.		Rawls’	reflective	equilibrium	approach	was	
inspired	by	Goodman	(1955).		But	while	Goodman	made	his	brief	remarks	in	the	
context	of	assessing	formal	systems,	hardly	any	of	the	literature	on	reflective	
	
40	A	bit	more	explanation	why	the	conditions	are	and	are	not	met	in	the	two	sampling	contexts:	In	
everyday	sampling	we	expect	there	to	be	many	more	non-black	things	around	us	than	ravens.		
Moreover,	learning	that	all	ravens	were	black	would	probably	tend	to	increase	the	number	of	black	
things	we	expected	to	see,	not	increase	the	count	of	non-black	items.		So	the	crucial	ratio	would	not	
increase	(or	at	least	not	dramatically	increase)	were	we	to	gain	this	information.		On	the	other	hand,	
learning	that	all	ravens	are	black	would	make	us	surprised	to	find	any	ravens	at	all	in	the	Hall	of	
Atypically-Colored	Birds	(because	if	all	ravens	are	black,	there	aren't	any	atypically-colored	ravens).			
So	in	that	sampling	context	the	ratio	does	dramatically	increase	(because	its	denominator	tends	
towards	zero),	and	the	second	condition	is	violated.					
41	While	Fitelson	and	Hawthorne	certainly	use	formal	methods,	they	don't	present	their	results	
explicitly	in	the	context	of	a	modeling	methodology.		For	novel	Bayesian	results	clearly	established	
using	formal	models,	see	Titelbaum	(2013,	esp.	Ch.	6	and	11).	
equilibrium	that	followed	Rawls	considered	it	as	a	methodology	for	formal	work.		
Carnap,	meanwhile,	articulated	explication	as	a	method	for	understanding	concepts.		
While	some	of	those	concepts	were	normative,	applying	explication	to	a	variety	of	
normative	domains	would	require	stretching	its	targets	beyond	just	the	conceptual.	
Hopefully	in	the	future	these	methodologies	(and	others)	will	be	adapted	to	
formal	work	on	norms.		At	that	point	we	will	be	able	to	compare	them	fairly	to	
normative	modeling,	and	see	how	multiple	methodologies	might	work	in	tandem	
towards	greater	philosophical	goals.		For	instance,	within	a	broader	reflective	
equilibrium	process,	a	modeling	methodology	might	be	used	locally	to	test	the	
consequences	of	embracing	particular	considered	judgments	about	cases.		But	for	
now,	such	possibilities	remain	largely	speculative.42		
	
	
	 	
	
42	I	am	grateful	to	Joachim	Horvath,	Catarina	Dutilh-Novaes	,	and	Mark	Colyvan	for	helpful	comments	
on	earlier	drafts	and	for	bringing	important	references	to	my	attention.		Thanks	also	to	an	audience	
at	“2019	Interdisciplinary	Colloquium	on	Probability	Theory:	Philosophy,	Physics,	and	Mathematics	
at	the	Crossroads”	in	São	Paulo,	Brazil.		Finally,	I	am	grateful	to	the	University	of	Wisconsin-Madison	
and	to	the	Australian	National	University,	at	which	I	completed	this	essay	during	a	Visiting	
Fellowship.	
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